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W
hen governments try to make
a decision on big transport
projects, the most desirable
starting point is a cost-benefit analysis,
which carefully assesses whether, and by
how much, the benefits to the country will
outweigh the costs. Traditionally, these
analyses have taken a rather narrow focus,
looking at the direct user benefits – that
is, the benefits to people making journeys.
In the case of the HS2 high-speed rail
link between London and the North, these
benefits – faster journeys, less disruption,
more capacity – are potentially large.
Unfortunately, so are the costs – and both
the costs and benefits are highly
uncertain. 
Supporters of the scheme think that
the costs of HS2 are being overstated by
focusing on the total costs and ignoring
the split between revenues and subsidies.
They say that fares would reduce the costs
to the government from around £30
billion to £17 billion.
Opponents of the scheme think that
the benefits – estimated at around £47
billion – are being overstated because they
are partly calculated by turning time
savings on HS2 into money by ‘valuing’
the time that people would save. The
problem with this, they argue, is that the
number used to value time savings is too
high because it assumes that people are
unproductive on trains.
Some supporters don’t disagree on
this point, but they think that the benefits
are understated because the number of
passengers will be higher than predicted.
They argue that HS2 uses conservative
numbers for passenger growth. There are
railway experts, however, that think that
HS2 has overstated passenger growth by
using projections from more recent years,
when the growth of passenger numbers
has been high.
In short, there is plenty to argue about
even if one focuses narrowly on these
direct user benefits and costs. But as
anyone who has been following the
debate will know, the arguments do not
just focus on these narrow issues.
Unfortunately, the wider costs and
benefits of HS2 are, if anything, even
more uncertain.
Public debate continues to rage about the
decision to build a new high-speed rail line
from London to Birmingham (and possibly
beyond). In the latest in our series on policies 
of the coalition government, Henry Overman
considers some of the arguments for and
against the scheme – and indicates why it has
been so controversial.
HS2:
assessing the costs 
and benefitsTake, for example, the claim by the
transport secretary, writing in the
Telegraph to mark the end of the public
consultation, that high-speed rail is ‘the
fast track fix for bridging the North-South
divide’. This is a clever, but completely
misleading, headline. The article itself is
more tempered – ‘tackling a divide that
has lasted for generations is no easy task’
– but it still makes big claims for the
potential impact of high-speed rail.
These claims rely on the assumption
that reducing journey times (and
increasing capacity) will help firms and
workers in the North to compete more
effectively for market share in the South
(or encourage firms and workers to
relocate). But HS2 will also give firms in
the South better access to markets in the
North. In line with this informal intuition,
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman and other
researchers working on the so-called ‘new
economic geography’ have shown that
reducing transport costs between ‘core’
(the South) and ‘periphery’ (the North)
may actually increase disparities, not
reduce them. Certainly the evidence on
the direct benefits suggests that these
flow disproportionately to London and the
South East.
What about the environmental
impact? In terms of carbon emissions, the
impacts are not large and could well be
negative. Most of the journeys on high-
speed rail will be additional (or transfers
from other lines). Extra journeys and faster
journeys generally require more energy not
less (especially if people drive to the train
station). There will be some savings on
long distance car trips and domestic air
travel – but the latter will be offset if freed
up slots are used for other flights or if 
HS2 makes getting to Heathrow easier
and so generates additional numbers on
other routes.
The overall impact depends on what is
assumed about how electricity is
generated. Generous assumptions using
average, not marginal, carbon figures
make the numbers look better. The last
time I looked at these numbers, HS2 was
predicting a change in average annual
emissions in a range from -0.41 to +0.44
million tonnes. This is equivalent to just 
+/-0.3% of current annual transport
emissions (and ignores the carbon impact
of construction). So the impacts are not
large and could be negative. 
Other environmental impacts arising
from the need to bulldoze a straight 
high-speed train line through some
beautiful countryside are harder to express
in financial terms. These effects clearly
explain much of the bitter local opposition
from people on the route. Actions to
mitigate them provide yet another
illustration of how costly HS2 could 
prove to be.
For example, the final decision on HS2
was delayed while the transport secretary
decided whether to spend an extra 
£500 million on another tunnel under 
the Chilterns. To put that figure in
perspective, we should note that it is 
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transport projects by the Autumn 2011
spending review.
Given all these uncertainties, it is not
hard to see why public opinion is so
divided. When the Department for
Transport asked people about HS2 last
year, 47% were in favour of HS2 and 9%
against. That sounds like resounding
support, until one notes that half of the
respondents (50%) agreed that ‘high-
speed rail is £30 billion we cannot afford’
while only a quarter disagreed with this
statement. In short, the public are in
favour of high-speed rail, providing that
they do not have to pay for it. 
The poll is also interesting on the
perceived benefits: 56% of adults agreed
that high-speed rail would be better for
the environment while 63% thought it
would create jobs and growth. As I have
shown, the evidence is fairly weak on the
former claim. And just as with the effects
on the North-South divide, the effects on
jobs and growth, other than the direct
impact of construction, are unknown.
(What’s more, construction jobs are part of
the cost to the economy – a much
misunderstood point.)
The fact that opinion polls highlight
these two ‘benefits’ suggests that most
people don’t know much about the
scheme – which turns out to be true: 42%
say that they know little or not very much
about the scheme, while 47% say they
know nothing.
In short, the costs and benefits of HS2
are large and uncertain. I prefer instead to
focus on the opportunity costs: are there
things that we could be doing with £30
billion that would yield a higher return
than ‘£47 billion’? I think the answer is
almost certainly yes, in both the area of
transport – more intra-city schemes, for
example – and more widely.
On the basis of narrow cost-benefit
analysis, this conclusion is backed up by
the Eddington report, published in 2006.
Comparing the figures for HS2 with those
for projects that the Department for
Transport had on its books at the time of
Eddington suggests that HS2 is, at best, in
the bottom quartile in terms of returns
(and indeed, might be closer to being in
the bottom 10%).
One could say that this is irrelevant
because HS2 has a critical mass that will
deliver wider benefits. But as I have
argued, there is a little evidence to
support this assertion. If critical mass is
important, then we could consider
concentrating a large amount of
investment in particular cities – for
example, Birmingham, London,
Manchester and Newcastle. To the best of
my knowledge, no one has assessed what
such a package would look like in terms
of the wider impacts.
One final objection to my negative
conclusion might be that ‘we have to have
HS2 because of capacity constraints on
the west coast mainline’. Unfortunately, as
the Eddington report showed, by the time
HS2 is completed, there will be a great
deal of congestion all over the transport
network. Other schemes to tackle that
congestion are likely to deliver much
better returns because these aspects are
well captured by traditional cost-benefit
analysis and, as I have indicated, HS2 does
pretty badly on that.
In short, the opportunity costs of HS2
are large. To me, this is the fundamental
issue and the reason why I am personally
sceptical about the merits of the project.
Quite simply, I remain unconvinced that
this is the best way for the government to
spend money. Over the last few years,
none of the assertions to the contrary has
changed my mind that this remains the
central problem with HS2.
Henry Overman is director of the Spatial
Economics Research Centre (SERC), professor
of economic geography at LSE and a research
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Further discussions of HS2 – and 
many other policy issues around cities,
regions, transport, housing and the
environment – are available on the SERC blog:
http://spatial-economics.blogspot.com/
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